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Abstract
Background. Freeman et al. (2020a, Psychological Medicine, 21, 1–13) argue that there is
widespread support for coronavirus conspiracy theories in England. We hypothesise that
their estimates of prevalence are inflated due to a flawed research design. When asking
respondents to their survey to agree or disagree with pro-conspiracy statements, they used
a biased set of response options: four agree options and only one disagree option (and no
‘don’t know’ option). We also hypothesise that due to these flawed measures, the Freeman
et al. approach under-estimates the strength of the correlation between conspiracy beliefs
and compliance. Finally, we hypothesise that, due to reliance on bivariate correlations,
Freeman et al. over-estimate the causal connection between conspiracy beliefs and compliance.
Methods. In a pre-registered study, we conduct an experiment embedded in a survey of a
representative sample of 2057 adults in England (fieldwork: 16−19 July 2020).
Results. Measured using our advocated ‘best practice’ approach (balanced response options,
with a don’t know option), prevalence of support for coronavirus conspiracies is only around
five-eighths (62.3%) of that indicated by the Freeman et al. approach. We report mixed results
on our correlation and causation hypotheses.
Conclusions. To avoid over-estimating prevalence of support for coronavirus conspiracies, we
advocate using a balanced rather than imbalanced set of response options, and including a
don’t know option.
Introduction
Psychological Medicine recently published a paper titled Coronavirus conspiracy beliefs, mis-
trust, and compliance with government guidelines in England (Freeman et al., 2020a). The
paper argues that there is widespread support for coronavirus conspiracy theories in the gen-
eral population of England, and that this may hinder public compliance with UK government
advice/instruction on appropriate behaviour during the ongoing coronavirus 2019 (Covid-19)
pandemic. The findings have been widely publicised by the authors and their university in a
press release (University of Oxford, 2020), leading to headlines such as ‘One fifth of English
people in study blame Jews or Muslims for Covid 19’ (Newsweek, 2020).
We strongly agree with Freeman et al. (2020a) about the importance of this topic. However,
consistent with concerns expressed by McManus, D’Ardenne, and Wessely (2020) and Sutton
and Douglas (2020), we hypothesise that the core claim in their paper about the prevalence of
belief in coronavirus conspiracy theories is flawed because Freeman et al. (2020a) use a highly
problematic measure of public support for conspiracy beliefs. In their survey, respondents were
asked to either agree or disagree with a range of coronavirus conspiracy statements by indicat-
ing one or other of the following options: ‘do not agree’, ‘agree a little’, ‘agree moderately’,
‘agree a lot’ or ‘agree completely’. This is an imbalanced set of response categories, with
four of the five categories representing support for the conspiracy theories and only one repre-
senting opposition. It makes agreement seem the norm and disagreement the exception. There
is thus a significant risk, using this set of response options, of over-estimating the prevalence of
support for Covid 19 conspiracies in the general population, and hence providing a false
account of public attitudes.
A core tenet of questionnaire design is to aim for neutrality. The fact that response effects
can be triggered by the subtlest of wording differences (e.g. Schuman & Presser, 1996) only
underlines the need to avoid more blatantly leading designs. Unbalanced response scales
like the one used by Freeman et al. (2020a) are therefore extremely rare. There is one exception
worth noting: the measurement of happiness. Because the distribution of self-reported happi-
ness is skewed such that most respondents are in the positive range of the scale, some research-
ers have experimented with scales that offer more options on that side of the neutral point
(Kalmijn, Arends, & Veenhoven, 2011; Liao, 2014). If it were well established that clear major-
ities endorsed Covid 19 conspiracies, there may be a case for offering more options to differ-
entiate shades of that agreement. But that is not established – indeed, polls point to
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conspiratorial reasoning being a minority position (even if some-
times a troublingly large minority). Even if it were, those using
unbalanced scales recommend offering at least two points on
each side of the neutral point (Liao, 2014).
Another reason for imbalance might be to encourage respon-
dents to endorse what they might reasonably see as socially
undesirable or counter-normative beliefs (Paulhus, 2018). It is
hard to test a priori the assumption underlying this choice,
namely that the greater danger is respondents with genuinely con-
spiratorial beliefs concealing them rather than respondents with-
out strong beliefs being led by a biased response scale. However,
decades of research confirming the shallowness and malleability
of public opinion (Converse, 1964; Zaller & Feldman, 1992)
point to the latter. This is presumably why survey methodologists
do not include unbalanced response scales when listing standard
techniques for trying to mitigate social desirability bias
(Nederhof, 1985).
An additional problem with the Freeman et al. (2020a)
response categories is the lack of an option for respondents to
indicate that they have no opinion or don’t know. Unlike imbal-
anced response scales, non-response options are something of a
grey area in survey methodology and omitting ‘don’t know’ can
be reasonable when measuring pure opinions, which require little
knowledge per se. However, it is not generally recommended for
measuring beliefs about the state of the world, especially in the
scientific realm (Tourangeau, Maitland, & Yan, 2016). It also
exacerbates the problem of imbalance. If respondents who are
genuinely unsure are forced to answer off the top of their head
(see Baka, Figgou, and Triga, 2012), they are more likely to choose
a middle option – typically a neutral category but, in the case of
the Freeman et al. (2020a) set of response options, an ‘agree’
category.
Finally, the set of statements that Freeman et al. (2020a) ask
their respondents to agree or disagree with are all statements in
support of a conspiracy theory. This exacerbates the problem of
acquiescence bias whereby respondents may tend, in general, to
agree with statements rather than disagree with them
(McClendon, 1991; Pasek & Krosnick, 2010)†1, again potentially
boosting declared support for the pro-conspiracy statements.
A more substantively balanced overall measure of attitudes to
coronavirus beliefs would include approximately equal numbers
of statements supportive of conspiracies and statements either
supporting official explanations or dismissing conspiratorial
explanations of coronavirus. This has two benefits. First, it
makes the overall scale a purer measure of the targeted attitudes
because acquiescence bias largely cancels out across the equal
number of pro-conspiracy and anti-conspiracy statements.
Second, whichever items are eventually selected for scaling, a
balanced set of items eases respondent suspicions that the
researchers have an agenda – either for or against conspiracies –
and thus makes any given item a more neutral measure of
attitudes (Billiet, 1995).2
Our concerns have been echoed by the Statistical Ambassador
of the Royal Statistical Society, Anthony B. Masters, who has
argued that the Freeman et al. (2020a) analysis is likely to over-
estimate the prevalence of support for coronavirus conspiracies
because of an imbalanced scale, lack of neutral option and acqui-
escence bias:
This is an unusual set of options. There are four options to agree, and only
one to disagree. There is no means to express having a neutral or no opin-
ion … The possible responses should balance between agreement and dis-
agreement … There is acquiescence bias. This is where people agree to a
statement, no matter what it says. Some people are agreeable, or want to
complete the survey. Such questions are easy to write, but may not give a
true reflection of public attitudes… Imbalanced options and acquiescence
bias means likely overestimation of agreement. This survey may overesti-
mate how many English adults hold conspiratorial beliefs. Question word-
ing and response options matter. Researchers should give balanced
response options. Press reports about single questions should refer to
the survey’s imbalanced options. (Masters, 2020)
We offer an improved measure of the prevalence of support for
coronavirus conspiracies that we believe provides a more accurate
portrayal of public beliefs. First, following best practice, instead of
the imbalanced set of response options offered by Freeman et al.
(2020a), our measure includes a symmetrical and balanced set of
response options: strongly disagree, disagree, slightly disagree,
slightly agree, agree, strongly agree. Second, following best prac-
tice, our measure offers respondents a ‘don’t know’ option for
each statement. Third, following best practice, our measure pre-
sents respondents with an approximately equally balanced set of
statements with which to agree or disagree: some of the state-
ments are supportive of coronavirus conspiracies and some are
consistent with the ‘true’ or official interpretation of coronavirus.
In our pre-registered study, we conduct a survey of the English
population and ask a representative sample of approximately 1000
respondents our ‘best practice’ survey questions. Our contention
is that this will elicit a more accurate description of public beliefs
than that reported by Freeman et al. (2020a). In order to demon-
strate exactly why the prevalence levels reported by Freeman et al.
(2020a) are likely to be over-estimates, we include an experimen-
tal component in our survey. Our experiment focuses on the main
flaw in the Freeman et al. (2020a) approach – specifically, the
response options they use. Alongside the ‘best practice’ format
described above, we add two further conditions. The first
condition replicates the Freeman et al. (2020a) approach.
Approximately 500 people receive the same set of questions but
with the exact response options (skewed in a positive direction)
used in the original Freeman et al. (2020a) study. The second con-
dition reverses the imbalance: approximately 500 people receive
the same questions but with response options skewed in a negative
direction. The total number of respondents to our survey (∼2000)
are thus randomly allocated in a 2:1:1 proportion among the three
conditions: ‘best practice’, ‘positive skew’ and ‘negative skew’.3
We hypothesise that agreement with coronavirus conspiracy
statements will be significantly lower in the ‘negative skew’ than
the ‘positive skew’ condition. If confirmed, this would provide dir-
ect experimental evidence showing that ‘skewing’ response
options when measuring support for coronavirus conspiracy
statements has an effect on the results.
Hypothesis 1: Agreement with Coronavirus conspiracy statements is
higher when response options are positively skewed (four ‘agree’ categor-
ies and one ‘disagree’ category) than when response options are negatively
skewed (four ‘disagree’ categories and one ‘agree’ category’)
We further hypothesise that agreement levels for the corona-
virus statements in our ‘best practice’ condition will be lower
than in the ‘positive skew’ condition. This would demonstrate
that having balanced substantive response options and a ‘don’t†The notes appear after the main text.
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know’ option leads to lower prevalence estimates than using a
positive skew response set, as used by Freeman et al. (2020a).
Hypothesis 2: Agreement with Coronavirus conspiracy statements is
higher when response options are positively skewed (four ‘agree’ categor-
ies and one ‘disagree’ category) than when response options are balanced
(three ‘agree’ and three ‘disagree categories) and also include a ‘don’t
know’ option.
Also, we expect that if we exclude the ‘don’t’ know’ respon-
dents from our ‘best practice’ condition in order to simply
focus on those offering a substantive response as is the case in
the other two conditions, our prevalence estimates will fall
between the ‘negative skew’ and ‘positive skew’ conditions.
Hypothesis 3: Agreement with Coronavirus conspiracy statements using a
balanced set of response options three ‘agree’ and ‘three disagree’ is (a)
lower than when using response options that are positively skewed (four
‘agree’ categories and one ‘disagree’ category), and (b) higher than when
using response options that are negatively skewed (four ‘disagree’ options
and one ‘agree’ option).
In addition to seeking to offer a more accurate portrayal of the
prevalence of coronavirus conspiracy beliefs, our study also
focuses on the relationship between conspiracy beliefs and com-
pliance with government guidelines and recommendations on
public behaviour to limit the spread of the virus. We expect to
observe, as Freeman et al. (2020a) did, a significant bivariate rela-
tionship between pro-conspiracy beliefs and reported compliance.
Given that we use a ‘best practice’ approach to measuring conspir-
acy beliefs we expect that we will observe a stronger bivariate rela-
tionship between conspiracy beliefs and compliance than that
observed by the Freeman et al. (2020a) approach. This is because
Freeman et al.’s (2020a) measures conflated all intensities of dis-
agreement with conspiracy statements into a single category and
hence were blunt instruments for measuring variation, and also
forced ‘don’t know’ respondents into a substantive category
when they may not really have the attitude associated with that
category.
Hypothesis 4: The bivariate relationship between support for Coronavirus
conspiracy statements and compliance with Coronavirus guidelines is
stronger when the multi-item conspiracy scale is generated from items
with balanced response options and a don’t know option than when the
multi-item conspiracy scale is generated using imbalanced response
options and no ‘don’t know’ option.
Our final hypothesis is about one of the preconditions for
making any causal claims about the relationship between corona-
virus conspiracy beliefs and compliant behaviour. Causal infer-
ence requires (among other things) a model of compliance that
also includes other obvious and simple explanatory factors that
are likely to be related to conspiracy beliefs and offer a plausible
explanation of compliance. Specifically, and in line with
Freeman et al. (2020a), we focus on the concept of mistrust.
However, while they only examined bivariate relationships, we
hypothesise that if a general measure of trust in political institu-
tions and medical professionals is introduced into the same model
as a measure of support for conspiracies, the apparent effect of the
latter will reduce significantly. Our suspicion is that non-
compliance will often be a function of low trust in those request-
ing compliance rather than a function of support for outlandish
and complex conspiratorial interpretations of the virus. This
suspicion is worth testing given the important policy implications
of the findings reported by Freeman et al. (2020a). They suggest
that conspiracy beliefs may be causally related to non-compliance
but, insofar as the underlying driver of non-compliance is simple
mistrust, then responses focused on combating conspiracy theor-
ies will be directed at the wrong target.
Hypothesis 5: The strength of the relationship between support for
Coronavirus conspiracy beliefs and compliance with Coronavirus guide-




We commissioned Deltapoll, an established British online survey
agency, to conduct a survey of a representative sample of 2000 of
the England population (achieved n = 2057; fieldwork 16−19 July
2020). Deltapoll invited members of online panels to participate.
Quotas were applied to the following variables: gender, age,
Government Office Region and 2019 vote. Data are weighted to
a number of geo-demographic and voter-graphic variables. First,
data are weighted to match demographic population targets
from reliable sources (such as population estimates from the
Office for National Statistics, the National Readership Survey, or
the Labour Force Survey): data are weighted by age within gender,
social class, household tenure work status, Government Office
Region, and educational attainment. Further sets of weights are
applied for recall of 2019 General Election vote, recall of 2016
EU referendum vote, and political attention (10-point scale
weighted to British Election Study face-to-face survey). Our sam-
pling and weighting approach thus yields a representative sample
of the England population and is similar to the approach adopted
by Freeman et al. (2020a). After the sample was initially recruited
to participate, just over 1% (28 out of 2085 respondents) declined
to continue once it was explained that the survey included some
detailed questions about different interpretations of coronavirus
(a similarly low discontinuation rate to that reported by
Freeman et al., 2020b).
Measures
Measuring prevalence of support for conspiracies:
experimental design
Respondents are randomly allocated to one of three conditions.
All three conditions contain 10 identical statements with which
respondents are asked to either agree or disagree. The response
options vary across the experimental conditions. In condition 1,
the response options are positively skewed (as per Freeman
et al., 2020a): do not agree, agree a little, agree moderately,
agree a lot, agree completely. In condition 2, the response options
are negatively skewed and are the opposite of the Freeman et al.
(2020a) options: disagree completely, disagree a lot, disagree mod-
erately, disagree a little, agree. In condition 3, the ‘best practice’
condition, the response options are balanced and include a
‘don’t’ know option: strongly disagree, disagree, slightly disagree,
slightly agree, agree, strongly agree, don’t know. The achieved
number of respondents for the survey was 2057, with 1045 in
the best practice condition, 511 in the positive skew condition
and 501 in the negative skew condition.
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All respondents are presented with the following 10
statements.
(1) Coronavirus is a bioweapon developed by China to destroy
the West.*
(2) Muslims are spreading the virus as an attack on Western
values.*
(3) The reason the government brought in lockdown rules limit-
ing people’s movements was to keep people safe and stop the
spread of coronavirus.
(4) Lockdown is a plot by environmental activists to control the
rest of us.*
(5) The coronavirus vaccine will contain microchips to control
the people.*
(6) The main reason for developing a vaccine for coronavirus is
to help people stay healthy, not to control them in some way.
(7) The idea that coronavirus is spread by the 5 G mobile net-
work is nonsense.
(8) The United Nations (UN) and World Health Organisation
(WHO) have manufactured the virus to take global control.*
(9) Jews have created the virus to collapse the economy for
financial gain.*
(10) Coronavirus was not deliberately created by anyone. It
started in China when the disease spread from animals
(such as bats) to humans.
Six of the 10 statements cover the range of themes covered in
the original 30 specific coronavirus conspiracy statements used by
Freeman et al. (2020a): malevolent actors creating the virus, using
the virus, and controlling vaccination against the virus.
Statements included in the survey claim that coronavirus was
deliberately created, or purposely spread, for various malevolent
reasons by Jews, China, the United Nations (UN)/World Health
Organisation (WHO), or Muslims. Also included was a statement
on environmental activists causing the ‘lockdown’ response to the
virus and a statement accusing vaccine makers of embedding
microchips in the vaccine to achieve control over the population.
Four of the 10 items included in the survey are non-conspiracy
statements: official or true statements relating to the cause of
spread of the virus, using the virus, and vaccination against the
virus. Specifically, they included statements that the virus was
not deliberatively created but emerged from animals in China,
that lockdown policy and vaccine creation are driven by public
health concerns, and that 5 G infrastructure does not cause the
virus.
We use a similar version of the wording used in the Freeman
et al. (2020a) survey to introduce the question to respondents:
‘Coronavirus has been a shock and lives have changed dramatic-
ally. At times of crisis, people may think of lots of different expla-
nations for what is occurring. We now present you with a wide
range of views about Coronavirus – some have a lot of evidence
supporting them, others have no evidence supporting them.
Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each view’.4
Measures of compliance
We ask respondents to indicate, on a 1–7 scale running from ‘not
at all’ to ‘completely’, how much they adhere to current guide-
lines, and how much they will comply with future guidelines.5
We ask three specific current compliance questions: on social dis-
tancing, handwashing and mask wearing, asking respondents how
often they have adhered in the preceding seven days (always,
often, sometimes, not very often, or never). For future
compliance, we asked respondents whether they intended to:
download a coronavirus app, isolate if contacted and requested
to do so, take a vaccine if developed, stop friends and family tak-
ing a vaccine, and wear a face mask (yes definitely, yes probably,
no probably not, or no definitely not).
Measures of trust
We ask respondents to indicate the extent to which they trust the
government, doctors, scientists, and the WHO (never, rarely,
sometimes, often, or always).
Pre-registration, ethics, and data transparency
Full details of this study were pre-registered before any data was
collected, including precise wording of the hypotheses, survey
details, and analytical strategy.6 Ethical approval for this study
was granted by the Ethics Committee of Queen’s University
Belfast’s School of History, Anthropology, Philosophy and
Politics. Data analysis was conducted using SPSS (26). The dataset
used in this study is publicly available, along with the code
required to replicate the analysis (SPSS syntax file).7 The study
was funded using resources from Queen’s University Belfast.
Results
Skewed positive v. skewed negative: testing Hypothesis 1
For each of the six conspiracy statements, we compare the per-
centage agreeing with the statement across two of the experimen-
tal conditions (positively skewed and negatively skewed response
options). As reported in columns 1 and 4 in Table 1, and as visu-
ally illustrated in Fig. 1, the percentage agreeing with each state-
ment is far smaller in the negative than the positive skew
condition, and is often negligible in absolute terms. On average
over the six items the percentage in the negative skew column
is only one quarter of the percentage in the positive skew column.
This finding demonstrates the massive effect that response option
skew has on the observed support for conspiracy statements, con-
firming Hypothesis 1.8
Best practice v. skewed: testing Hypothesis 2
For each of the individual coronavirus conspiracy items we com-
pare our advocated ‘best practice’ condition (balanced response
set and a ‘don’t know’ option) to the positive skew condition as
used by Freeman et al. (2020a). As reported in columns 1 and
3 in Table 1, and as visually illustrated in Fig. 1, in all six cases
the prevalence of support is lower, hence confirming
Hypothesis 2. On average the prevalence of support in the best
practice condition is only five eigths – 62.3% – the size of the
prevalence reported in the positive skew (Freeman et al., 2020a)
condition. For example, the positive skew method would indicate
that 23% agreement with the claim that ‘Muslims are spreading
the virus as an attack on Western values’. On our best practice
estimate, this proportion is 13%.9
Best practice minus ‘don’t knows’ v. skewed: testing
Hypothesis 3
To focus in all conditions on those who provided a substantive
response, we exclude the ‘don’t know’ respondents from the
‘best practice’ condition. For each conspiracy statement we
4 John Garry et al.
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compare the percentage agreeing across all three conditions. As
reported in columns 1, 2, and 4 in Table 1, and as visually illu-
strated in Fig. 1, for all six items, the percentage agreeing in the
‘balanced, excluding don’t knows’ group is lower than the positive
skew and higher than the negative skew conditions, hence con-
firming hypothesis 3.
Conspiracies and compliance: testing Hypothesis 4
Using the respondents in our ‘best practice’ condition (n = 1045)
we investigate whether a reliable scale of attitudes to coronavirus
conspiracies can be generated from responses to the full set of
10 statements. Principal components factor analysis and
investigation of Cronbach’s alpha revealed that responses to the
10 items did not reduce to a single dimension. As often happens
with balanced scales (e.g. Schriesheim & Eisenbach, 1995; Zhang,
Noor, & Savalei, 2016), two dimensions emerged according to
whether the items are worded in a positive or negative direction.
This attests to the power of acquiescence which, by making some
respondents agree with both pro- and anti-conspiracy statements,
weakens the expected negative correlation between the two. This
underlines the case for balanced scales if the goal is a less biased
estimate of the overall level of support for conspiracy beliefs.
However, it means that further work needs to be done to develop
an effective unidimensional measure from a battery made up of
pro- and anti-conspiracy statements.









Coronavirus is a bioweapon developed by China to destroy the
West
47.8 36.6 31.7 13.2
Muslims are spreading the virus as an attack on Western values 22.8 14.2 13.4 5.7
Lockdown is a plot by environmental activists to control the
rest of us
25.9 18.1 17.2 6.2
The coronavirus vaccine will contain microchips to control the
people
27.2 18.9 17.1 8.9
The United Nations (UN) and World Health Organisation (WHO)
have manufactured the virus to take global control
31.1 20.4 18.8 6.9
Jews have created the virus to collapse the economy for
financial gain
17.8 11.2 10.6 4.1
aConfirming Hypothesis 3, for all items the % falls between the negative skew % and positive skew %; all differences with negative skew statistically significant at 0.001 level and all
differences with positive skew statistically significant at 0.001.
bConfirming Hypothesis 2, for all items the % is lower than the % in the positive skew column at 0.001 level of statistical significance.
cConfirming Hypothesis 1, for all items the % is lower than the % in the positive skew column at 0.001 level of statistical significance.
Fig. 1. Support for Covid 19 conspiracy statements, by type of response options.
Confirming Hypothesis 1, for all items in the negative skew condition the % is lower than the % in the positive skew condition at 0.001 level of statistical signifi-
cance. Confirming Hypothesis 2, for all items in the best practice condition the % is lower than the % in the positive skew condition at 0.001 level of statistical
significance. Confirming Hypothesis 3, for all items the balance without don’t know % falls between the negative skew % and positive skew %; all differences with
negative skew significant at 0.001 and all differences with positive skew significant at 0.001 of statistical significance. 95% confidence intervals are reported.
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Partly for that reason, and partly to provide a more direct com-
parison with the unbalanced scale results reported by Freeman
et al. (2020a), we focus here on responses to the six pro-
conspiracy statements and use those to generate – for all three
experimental conditions – a summed scale running from anti-
to pro-coronavirus conspiracies. We recalibrated these scales to
run from 0 to 1.
To test hypothesis 4, we compare this coronavirus conspiracy
beliefs scale to measures of adherence to guidelines on corona-
virus. We first describe the distributions on the adherence mea-
sures. As reported in Table 2, few respondents indicate that
they are not adhering, or planning not to adhere, to coronavirus
guidelines. Most of the variation on the 7-point scales is between
the mid-point and ‘completely’ adhering. As reported in Table 3,
public adherence to both social distancing and handwashing is
high, with most of the variation being between ‘always’ and
‘sometimes’. On wearing face masks (which had not yet become
mandatory at the time of fieldwork), there are almost similar pro-
portions at both ends of the scale: 30% say ‘always’ and 27% say
‘never’. Table 4 reports intended adherence with new guidelines.
One third say they would not download a coronavirus app onto
their phone. Only one in 10 say they would not self-isolate if con-
tacted and asked to do so. One in seven say they would not take a
vaccine, or would stop family and friends taking a vaccine, while
only 8% say they do not intend to wear a mask when it becomes
mandatory to do so.
For each of these 10 adherence items we calculate a Pearson
correlation between the item and the 0–1 coronavirus conspiracy
scale, broken down by experimental condition.10 The correlations
are reported in Fig. 2. First, we compare the correlations in the
best practice condition to the correlations in the positive skew
(Freeman et al. (2020a)) condition. In two of the 10 comparisons
the correlations are identical. In seven out of the other eight cor-
relation comparisons there is a higher positive correlation in the
best practice condition than in the positive skew condition.
Next, we compare correlations in the best practice condition to
correlations in the negative skew condition. The former yields a
higher positive correlation than the latter in nine out of 10
cases. Hence, overall, 16 out of 18 comparable cases (89%) are
consistent with hypothesis 4. However, the observed differences
in correlation strength are typically not statistically significant
(as shown in Fig. 2). Hence, Hypothesis 4 is weakly supported.
Insofar as stronger correlations denote better measurement, our
best practice response scale looks superior than the Freeman
et al. (2020a) approach but the lack of significant differences is
an indication that the difference is not large.
Table 2. Following recommendations from government to prevent the spread of the coronavirus…?
Not at all Completely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 dk
Are you following recommendations? 0.7 0.7 3.2 7.9 21.3 30.9 34.3 1.0
Will you follow future Recommendations…? 0.9 0.4 3.0 8.1 19.7 31.1 34.2 2.6




Have you stayed at least one metre away from other people when outside
your home?
50.5 28.4 13.4 3.8 2.8 1.1
Did you wash your hands with soap and water straight away after returning
home from a public place?
57.8 20.3 14.0 4.5 2.8 0.6
Did you wear a face mask when you were in a shop or on public transport? 30.4 15.9 13.5 9.6 27.0 3.5









If advised by government, would you download a contact tracing app onto
your phone to help control the spread of the coronavirus?
26.9 31.4 18.7 15.6 7.4
If you were contacted by the NHS and urged to self-isolate (stay at home)
because you had been in contact with someone with Coronavirus, would
you do so?
61.3 26.0 7.3 2.5 2.8
If a new vaccine were to be developed that could prevent Coronavirus,
would you take it?
50.9 26.8 9.1 5.6 7.7
Would you try to stop family and friends from taking a new Coronavirus
vaccine?
4.9 8.8 19.5 59.1 7.7
From July 24 everyone must by law wear a face mask when they are in a
shop or on public transport. Will you do so?
71.4 17.9 4.7 3.3 2.7
6 John Garry et al.
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Conspiracies, trust, and compliance: testing Hypothesis 5
To test hypothesis 5, we focus on the role of public trust in insti-
tutions and professions. In relation to the distribution of opinion
on each our four trust measures, doctors are most trusted (39%
always trust), followed by scientists (21%) and the WHO (14%),
and the government is least trusted (7%) (Table 5). The four
trust items did not produce a strong uni-dimensional scale,
with a Cronbach’s alpha below perhaps the most commonly
cited cut-off point of 0.7 (Nunnally, 1978) and substantial scale
improvement was indicated if items were deleted. Hence, we use
the distinct trust items in our analysis.
For each of the 10 adherence outcome measures we run two
OLS regressions: in model 1 we include only the pro-conspiracy
beliefs scale and in model 2 we additionally include the four dis-
trust variables. All outcome measures and predictors were coded
0–1 to facilitate easy interpretation of the maximum effect of each
variable, and all outcome measures were coded such that higher
scores indicated greater non-adherence. As reported in Fig. 3
(see online Supplementary materials for full regression results),
in relation to outcome measure ‘future: general’ we see that a gen-
eral intention not to adhere to future Covid 19 guidelines is
strongly predicted by belief in conspiracy theories. Comparing
respondents at the most pro-conspiracy end of the conspiracy
beliefs scale to those with lowest belief in conspiracy theories is
associated with a difference of over one third of the range of
responses on the non-adherence measure. However, the conspir-
acy beliefs effect reduces substantially (down to one fifth of the
response range), and statistically significantly, upon the introduc-
tion of the distrust measures: conspiracy beliefs and distrust in
doctors are equally powerful predictors. A more dramatic effect
is shown for the ‘future: isolate’ outcome measure (an initially
strong conspiracy beliefs effect is reduced and outperformed by
distrust in doctors) and ‘future: app’ (an initially strong conspir-
acy beliefs effect is reduced and outperformed by distrust in gov-
ernment and the WHO). Conversely, in relation to ‘current:
general’, ‘current: social distance’ and most especially in relation
to ‘stop vaccine’ the effect of pro-conspiracy beliefs initially was,
and remained, very strong. Thus, Hypothesis 5 is only partially
confirmed: only in relation to four out of the 10 adherence out-
comes measures (future: general, future: isolate, future: app and
current: masks) does the introduction of the trust variables either
render the conspiracy predictor non-statistically significant or
generate a statistically significant reduction in its effect.
Fig. 2. Correlations between Covid conspiracy support and adherence.
Consistent with Hypothesis 4, there is a higher positive correlation between conspiracy beliefs and adherence when the best practice measure is used than when
the positive skew (Freeman et al.) measure (or negative skew) measure is used (in 16 out of 18 cases, two cases are identical). However, the differences are not
typically statistically significant. Hence, the Hypothesis 4 is only weakly supported.
Table 5. To what extent do you trust…?
Never trust Rarely trust Some-times trust Often trust Always trust dk
The government 12.4 22.5 33.2 24.1 6.5 1.3
Doctors 1.4 4.2 15.2 38.6 39.3 1.3
Scientists 2.6 7.4 22.0 44.8 21.0 2.3
World Health Organisation (WHO) 5.3 11.5 25.2 37.8 14.3 6.0
Psychological Medicine 7
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291720005164
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 86.30.88.132, on 23 Apr 2021 at 13:51:53, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Which population groups believe conspiracies and mistrust?
If, as just described, believing coronavirus conspiracies and mis-
trusting institutions/professions are both associated with non-
adherence, it is important to identify which particular groups in
the population are most prone to having these traits as this may
be helpful for any consideration of how to effectively respond.
To shine an exploratory light,11 we run OLS regressions with
Fig. 3. Effect of pro-conspiracy beliefs on adherence, without (model 1) and with (model 2) distrust variables.
Note: all predictor and outcome measures are coded 0-1, co-efficients and 95% confidence intervals reported from OLS regressions (see online Supplementary
materials for full details). For some adherence measures (e.g. future: isolate) trust variables reduce conspiracy effect, and not others (e.g. stop vaccine). Partial
confirmation of Hypothesis 5.
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the measures of conspiracy beliefs, distrust, and adherence as out-
comes and the following as predictors: gender (male/female), age
(young: under 40, mid: 40−59, old: 60 or older), education (univer-
sity versus non-university), income (low, middle, or high), urban
residency v. not, and religiosity (self-described as religious versus
not). The full results are reported in the online Supplementary
materials, but for simplicity we illustrate the key findings in Fig. 4.
In short, being young is by far the most important demo-
graphic predictor of conspiracy belief, mistrust, and non-
adherence. Also, being low-income, urban and religious predicts
being supportive of conspiracies. Being male is a strong predictor
of six of the 10 adherence outcomes, and being low-income,
urban and religious predict several adherence measures.12 The
effect of high education varies, being related to greater mask wear-
ing and app downloading, but also to a higher likelihood of trying
to stop others taking a vaccine.13
Discussion
We agree with Freeman et al. (2020a) that it is important to study
the extent and possible impact of coronavirus conspiracy beliefs.
To ignore or underestimate those beliefs, and their possible con-
sequences for compliance with public health measures, would be a
mistake. However, to overestimate these beliefs and their impact is
also a mistake. Good methodological practice is all the more
important in the middle of a pandemic. Publishing and publicis-
ing those overestimates risks two serious negative consequences. It
may further stigmatise certain groups who are blamed by conspir-
acy theorists, and it may encourage the re-direction of scarce pub-
lic resources towards countering the over-estimated conspiracy
views instead of countering more plausible and potent hindrances
to compliant public health behaviour (McManus et al., 2020;
Sutton & Douglas, 2020). Indeed, on the estimation of prevalence,
‘misleading evidence may be more damaging than no evidence at
all’ (McManus et al., 2020).
In this paper, we have empirically demonstrated that the
response options used by Freeman et al. (2020a) lead to signifi-
cantly inflated estimates of prevalence – sometimes almost double
the level recorded by the more conventional approach of a
balanced response scale with a don’t know option. Our findings
on the inflated estimates provided by the Freeman et al. (2020a)
approach echo those of Sutton and Douglas (2020), whose similar
experiment with a convenience sample used three of the same
survey items as in our study. Using our own ‘best practice’ mea-
sures, and drawing on evidence from a high-quality representative
sample of the population, we have provided more accurate esti-
mates of the prevalence of support for coronavirus conspiracies.
We strongly advocate that future research avoids the problems
of over-estimation associated with the Freeman et al. (2020a)
approach.14
It is worth emphasising that our intent here is to estimate
accurately the incidence of coronavirus conspiracy beliefs rather
than to downplay or minimise the importance of the problem.
While our estimates are substantially lower than those provided
by Freeman et al. (2020a), they still indicate that non-trivial pro-
portions of the population support coronavirus conspiracy beliefs.
In that sense, our results represent a partial replication of the find-
ings of Freeman et al. (2020a). We disagree with them about the
extent of, but not the existence of, conspiratorial thinking in this
vital area.
Fig. 4. Socio-demographic bases of support for Covid conspiracies, distrust, and non-adherence.
Note 1: derived from regression analyses reported in online Supplementary materials
Note 2: ✓ indicates that people with the demographic trait have a deficiency on the outcome measure, i.e. young people are more likely to believe in conspiracies
and are more distrusting of government, etc. The more ✓s the stronger the relationship. ✓ statistically significant at 0.05, ✓✓ statistically significant at 0.001, ✓✓✓
statistically significant at 0.001 and co-efficient at least double the size of the next largest co-efficient. These distinctions are to facilitate a quick sense of the
results; please see full details in the online Supplementary materials.
Note 3: x indicates the opposite relationship, i.e. males are less distrusting of government.
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Our suggested ‘best practice’ approach is not only about pro-
viding a more accurate estimate of the distribution of conspiracy
beliefs. Better measurement also means less bias in estimating the
correlation of those beliefs with other substantive variables, not-
ably current and future adherence to the guidelines and rules
that are key to controlling the virus. Our hypothesis on that
front was only weakly confirmed, however. As is typically the
case, correlational results are more resistant to question wording
effects than are the distributions of individual variables
(Schuman & Presser, 1996).
Of course, estimates of any causal effect of conspiratorial
beliefs on compliance requires not just good measurement but
also a move beyond bivariate correlations. By taking a step in
that direction with controls for trust in various actors, we have
provided a more restrained estimate of the potential effect of con-
spiracy beliefs on adherence. This was just one step. The coeffi-
cients for both conspiracy beliefs and trust may still be inflated
by omitted variable bias. Confident causal inference would require
much more fully specified models than were permitted by our pri-
marily methodological survey. This only reinforces the need for
caution before claiming or even implying that a correlation or
regression coefficient indicates the kind of causal effect that pol-
icymakers should beware of. We acknowledge, however, that the
bivariate relationship between conspiracy beliefs and adherence
observed by Freeman et al. (2020a) is partially replicated in our
analysis even when controlling for trust (see also Allington,
Duffy, Wessely, Dhavan, and Rubin, 2020 and Roozenbeek
et al., 2020).
In what has unavoidably been a critical piece, we want to end
on a constructive and collegial note. While we have disagreed on
methodological grounds with the measurement choices made by
Freeman et al. (2020a) and do not wish our findings to be mis-
construed as ‘exaggerated’ (Freeman et al., 2020c), we do not con-
test that the phenomenon of coronavirus conspiracy beliefs is
important, should be taken seriously, and is worthy of further sys-
tematic study. In this spirit, we look forward to engaging in fur-
ther work on the shared objective of identifying how
widespread support for conspiracies is and identifying the extent
to which such support may causally determine behaviour on
adherence to virus guidelines.
Supplementary material. The supplementary material for this article can
be found at https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291720005164
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Notes
1 A commonplace example relates to the questionnaires used to measure stu-
dents’ evaluation of teaching. These often contain batteries of positively
worded statements (rather than an equal balance of positively and negatively
worded statements) with which the respondents are asked to agree or disagree
(see e.g. Kember & Ginns, 2012).
2 Note that some authors defend the use of batteries of positively worded
items when generating multi-item scales (Matlock, Turner, & Gitchel, 2018;
see also Schriesheim & Eisenbach, 1995; and Zhang et al., 2016).
3 Sutton and Douglas (2020) report results of an experiment on a convenience
sample which focused on asking three of the Freeman et al. (2020a) survey
items with different response option sets. Their study provides provisional evi-
dence of over-estimation arising from using the positively skewed response set
used by Freeman et al. (2020a) compared to a balanced nine-point scale and a
balanced five-point scale. Though motivated by similar concerns, our study is
independent of the Sutton and Douglas (2020) study, and was pre-registered
prior to the publication of the Sutton and Douglas (2020) correspondence.
4 This 10-item battery was the final question in the survey. Directly after
answering the question, respondents were presented with the information
that all six conspiracy statements have no evidence supporting them, and
respondents were advised to use reliable sources of information such as the
NHS and the WHO.
5 The measures of compliance and measures of trust used in our survey are
similar to, but not exact replications of, compliance and trust items asked in
the Freeman et al. (2020a, 2020b, 2020c) study. Note that all our compliance
and trust questions include a ‘don’t know’ option.
6 The study was pre-registered with the Open Science Framework (OSF), date
stamped 15 July 3.06pm (on the ‘Attitudes to Covid 19’ project website).
Pre-registration occurred once the very final version of the questionnaire
had been agreed with the survey company. Data collection commenced on
16 July and ended on 19 July. Link to pre-registration: https://osf.io/uhjqm/
7 Available on the ‘Attitudes to Covid 19’ project website on OSF. Data and
coding in STATA format are also available. Link to data: https://osf.io/uhjqm/
8 Note that the % agreement in our positive skew experimental condition is
very similar to the % agreement in the positively skewed original Freeman
et al. (2020a) study. On the China, Jew and Muslim items, the estimates are
within three percentage points of each other. This high degree of similarity
suggests that the approaches to generating a good quality representative sample
are consistent across our study and the original Freeman et al. (2020a). In con-
trast, in the study by Sutton and Douglas (2020) that focused on these three
particular items, the % agreement in their positive skew condition was
extremely low (only 2 or 3% on the Muslim and Jew items), which is indicative
of their sample being more akin to a convenience sample than a representative
sample (and hence useful for experimentally identifying differences but not for
providing reliable prevalence estimates).
9 We also compared our three experimental conditions in terms of the num-
ber of conspiracy beliefs each respondent supported. Respondents in the posi-
tive skew (Freeman et al., 2020a, 2020b, 2020c) condition support 1.73
conspiracy beliefs, those in the negative skew condition support 0.45, and
those in our ‘best practice’ (balanced response options, with don’t know) con-
dition support 1.09 (all mean differences statistically significant at the 0.001
level). The problem of inflated estimates of agreement at item level accumu-
lates over the full set of items, leading to large over-estimates of consistent pro-
conspiracy beliefs when using the positive skew (Freeman et al. (2020a, 2020b,
2020c) approach): 14.6% of respondents in the positive skew condition agreed
with all six pro-conspiracy statements compared to only 3.5% in our ‘best prac-
tice’ condition (and 0.6% in the negative skew condition).
10 The substantive results are the same if, given the ordinal nature of some of
the adherence items, we calculate Kendall’s tau-b correlations instead.
11 We do not have pre-registered specific hypotheses on the direction of the
relationships.
12 See Allington et al. (2020) for similar findings on age and gender.
13 While an effective response may vary depending on the particular adher-
ence behaviour under consideration, we speculate that one constructive
approach may be to identify creative ways of demonstrating to young people
the trustworthiness of their own doctor. That doctor is then in a stronger pos-
ition to impart the message that conspiracies are indefensible and that follow-
ing Covid guidelines is necessary for the health of self and others.
14 The Freeman et al. findings have, according to the Altmetric information
on the journal website as of 26 November 2020, been reported by 140 news
outlets around the world, conveying an inflated sense of the prevalence of con-
spiracy beliefs to a very broad audience.
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